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Abstract:  
Legal consideration of extraterritorial obligations contained in the European Convention of Human 
Rights have largely developed in respect of military occupation or the custodial control of individuals. 
For a number of reasons situations involving transnational cooperation have received little judicial 
scrutiny. This paper examines human rights concerns associated with the rapidly expanding field of 
transnational education an activity frequently reliant on interstate cooperation. By re-examining the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights the legal obligations of countries establishing 
engaged in public activity overseas are explored. The analysis is structured around a case study on the 
oversight of a European education facility affected by Bahrain’s controversial response to pro-reform 
protests.  
Key words: transnational, human rights, university, branch campus, torture, extraterritorial 
obligations  
Introduction    
In recent years, the question of states’ extraterritorial human rights obligations have been the subject 
of intense debate.1  This interest has been sparked by two separate developments: first, an increased 
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body of case-law from regional and international courts where the question of the scope and extent 
of extraterritorial human rights obligations (ETOs) have been addressed;2 and secondly, a recognition 
that human rights of individuals are increasingly being affected by actions or omissions by foreign 
states or their agents.  This has led to a question of the relevance of human rights law if it only focuses 
on the territorial state’s actions or omissions.3  
In this paper, we address how attention to a narrow cluster of scenarios brought before judicial 
consideration have resulted in certain ETOs being constructed and considered against a restrictive set 
of factual circumstances. Most of the judicial attention regarding the reach of extraterritorial human 
rights obligations has concerned situations where a foreign state is an occupying power, or it has 
military or custodial control over one or more individuals whose human rights are allegedly breached.  
This substantive focus may have restricted the legal debate to inter-state conflict, violence against 
individuals and detention at the expense of broader diversity of threats to human rights for which 
foreign states may be fully or partially responsible.  Consequently fields of transnational cooperation, 
owing to their genesis under invitation and consent, have tended to fall outside of human rights law’s 
jurified field of focus.  
One increasingly prominent and rapidly growing field of inter-state cooperation is transnational 
education. Since its emergence in the 1990s it typically involves significant public engagement and 
monitoring between home and hosts states. Defined by the Council of Europe4 as any higher education 
study programme in which the learners are located in a country different from the one where the 
awarding institution is based, it requires a set of practical arrangements extending the reach of 
regulatory systems to host countries.5 In its most advanced form “branch campuses” are dependent 
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on deep cooperation including local registration, transnational accreditation and quality assurance 
protocols.6 While South–South initiatives have emerged it is institutions from the global North that 
have been at the forefront in establishing branch campuses in the global South.7  
At the time of writing it is estimated that there are at least 210 branch campuses operating globally, 
a figure that does not include certain franchises, partnerships, ‘twinning’ agreements and other formal 
arrangements between institutions.8 Given the public administrative processes underpinning the 
delivery and standardisation of tertiary education this activity potentially falls within the scope of 
human rights obligations that bind cooperating states. This nexus has become increasingly visible with 
the expansion of Western education programmes into states with questionable human rights records 
where institutions have contended with or ignored human rights challenges ranging from restriction 
on the freedom of expression to the use of bonded labour.9 Likewise the rapid expansion of Confucius 
Institutes on Western campuses, funded by China’s Ministry of Education, has raised similar concerns 
for human rights, academic freedoms and transparency.10 
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labour-qatar-campus (last accessed 2 March 2015). See also Lucy Hodges, ‘Warwick’s Singapore fling’ The 
Independent (London, 1 September 2005) at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/education/higher/warwicks-
singapore-fling-309381.html (last accessed 2 April 2015). 
10 Jon Marcus ‘West’s universities reconsider China-funded Confucius Institutes’ Times Higher Education 
(London, 4 April 2013) at  
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Approximately 60 Western education institutions or programmes currently operate in the Persian 
Gulf region alone.11 One particular example which has received significant international attention 
following the Arab Spring protests is the campus of an Irish education institute in Bahrain operated by 
the ‘Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland’.12  In this article, Ireland’s interaction with Bahrain will be 
used to explore the extent and substance of human rights obligations under the European Convention 
on Human Rights engaged through the provision and regulation of transnational education. To make 
this case study generalizable we selectively focus on the definitively public oversight mechanisms that 
extend from Ireland to Bahrain. This is to facilitate a clear human rights analysis and avoid conceptual 
murkiness surrounding the public/private nature of the increasingly marketised “University”. 
Ultimately this serves to focus on what is being deterritorialised: the degree awarding powers and the 
external review mechanisms for formal ‘recognition’, often referred to as ‘accreditation’. This legal 
analysis will be of relevance to other fields of civil cooperation and the transnational exercise of public 
functions such as the overseas activities of state-owned enterprises, where private corporations 
exercise public functions via procurement contracts, and other forms of transnational cooperation 
involving public oversight.13  
We explore to what extent Ireland (the ‘contracting state’), whose agents or institutions, upon 
invitation, carry out a role of public authority in a Bahrain (‘territorial state’), retain their human rights 
obligations under the ECHR.  We will start by examining some of the key cases by the European Court 
of Human Rights related to states’ extraterritorial human rights obligations (Part I).  In Part II, we will 
address how extraterritorial obligations go beyond situations of occupation, custodial or military 
control by discussing the wider application of extraterritorial obligations when a contracting state acts 
on the basis of invitation or consent from the territorial state.  This section will largely focus on the 
understanding of what constitutes the exercise of public authority or function as a foundation for 
extraterritorial jurisdiction. From this vantage we can assess how transnational cooperation such as 
the situation in Bahrain’s medical facilities engages Ireland’s human rights obligations through its role 
in regulating medical education.14 Part III will consider the human rights concerns that arise related to 
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8547097.html last accessed 2 April 2015. 
13 Examples of such forms of cooperation include border control efforts and outsourcing public expertise e.g. 
Emma Graham-Harrison and David Batty, ‘Ministry of Justice bids for contract with Saudi prison service’ The 
Guardian (London, 25 January 2015) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/25/ministry-justice-
contract-saudi-arabia-prison?CMP=share_btn_fb (last accessed 24 March 2015) 
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the Bahraini medical facilities during and after the 2011 protests and what Ireland’s extraterritorial 
human rights obligations were in this situation and how they could have complied with them. Such a 
vignette provides a useful means to interrogate the role of international cooperation in the production 
and scope of extra-territorial human rights obligations. Part IV considers how positive obligations arise 
in this type of transnational arrangement.  
 
Part I - Extraterritorial Obligations of states as reflected in current case law 
The discussion of the effects of the influence and harm of one state’s actions to another state has a 
long history in international law.  In the Trail Smelter Case the tribunal very firmly laid down the 
principle that no state is permitted under international law to cause damage to the territory, property 
or persons in another state’s territory.15 Similarly, the International Court of Justice, the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, have over the past 30 years 
heard a number of cases related to the negative effect of one state’s actions upon the enjoyment of 
human rights of individuals in another state, and jurisprudence in this area is developing and evolving.  
A common feature of the case law in this area involves addressing the following questions: how 
does an act by one state in a foreign state fall under the jurisdiction of the first state; and if that is 
confirmed, does this relate to territorial or custodial control over the area or persons suffering adverse 
effects from the actions.   
The European Court of Human Rights has confirmed on a number of occasions that the reach of 
the European Convention on Human Rights can in ‘exceptional circumstances’ go beyond the territory 
of a High Contracting Party.  One of the first cases where this was accepted was in Loizidou vs. Turkey16 
which concerned the ability of a Greek-Cypriot to access her property in Northern Cyprus after the 
Turkish occupation of that part of the island.  The Turkish government held that the case could not be 
admissible as it concerned an area outside the territory of Turkey. However, the European Court of 
Human Rights clearly stated that a state’s responsibility for its own acts can reach outside the territory 
of that state, if acts of their authorities produced effects outside their territory.17 
                                                          
authors’ wish to disregard the jurisprudence developed by other international or regional human rights courts 
or institutions.  
15 Trail Smelter Case (United States vs. Canada), 3 R.I.A.A.  1905 (1941), quoted in Gibney, Tomasevski and 
Vedsted-Hansen (1999) n 1 above at [273]. 
16 Loizidou (preliminary objections) n 2 above. 
17 ibid. at [62]. 
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In the famous Bankovic case,18 the Court considered very carefully whether the killing of individuals 
as a result of the bombing of a television tower in Belgrade by NATO forces, could be considered to 
fall within the jurisdiction of the relevant NATO members that are parties to the ECHR.  The Court built 
its arguments on the concepts of ‘effective control’ inspired by the Nicaragua case19 heard by the ICJ.  
While the Nicaragua case concerned questions of attribution of acts (to the USA) for the purpose of 
triggering state responsibility; the ECtHR used a similar ‘test’ of effective control over territory to 
determine whether or not the acts of the NATO forces were within the jurisdiction of the member 
states, and thus would allow the Court to hear the case on its merits.  Article 1 of the ECHR provides 
that the State Parties ‘shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms 
defined in Section I of this Convention.’  In this case, the Court confirmed that in exceptional 
circumstances, acts outside the territory of a member state can fall within that state’s jurisdiction.20  
However, this could only happen if it was confirmed that the state had ‘effective control’ over the 
territory where the said acts were taking place.21  Concerning the ‘effective control’ the Court held 
that:   
[T]he responsibility of a Contracting Party was capable of being engaged when as a 
consequence of military action (lawful or unlawful) it exercised effective control of an area 
outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the Convention rights 
and freedoms was found to derive from the fact of such control whether it was exercised 
directly, through the respondent State’s armed forces, or through a subordinate local 
administration.22 
In later cases, the Court has been more nuanced in its acceptance of extraterritorial jurisdiction of 
the High Contracting Parties to the ECHR.  In the Issa case,23 the Court found that states may exercise 
jurisdiction outside the ‘espace juridique’ of the European system. In this case, which was brought by 
relatives of individuals in Northern Iraq who it was claimed had been killed by Turkish soldiers, the 
Court confirmed that a Party to the convention  
 
May also be held accountable for violations of the Convention rights and freedoms of persons 
in the territory of another state but who are found to be under the former State’s authority 
and control through its agents operating – whether lawfully or unlawfully – in that latter State 
… accountability in such situations stems from the fact that Article 1 of the Convention cannot 
be interpreted so as to allow a State party to perpetrate violations of the Convention on the 
territory of another State, which it could not perpetrate on its own territory.24 
                                                          
18 Bankovic n 2 above. 
19 Nicaragua v. the United States, 27 June 1986, ICJ reports, 1986 
20 Bankovic n 2 above at [71]. 
21 ibid 
22 Bankovic n 2 above [70]. 
23 Issa v. Turkey  App No 31821/96 [2004] ECHR 629. 
24 ibid at [71].  
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The final case from the European Court of Human Rights to be mentioned at this point, is Al Skeini 
v. UK.25 This case brought new clarification to the Court’s approach to extraterritorial jurisdiction for 
the states parties to the ECHR. It concerned the UK’s violation of Convention rights for Iraqi individuals 
in Basra in Iraq, where a number of detainees died in custody and others had been killed by UK soldiers 
in the streets of Basra.  Rather than focusing uniquely on territorial control as part of ‘effective control’ 
the Court in this case distinguished between ‘state agent and control’26 over persons on the one hand, 
and ‘effective control over an area’27 on the other.  This is a clear indication that the Court has moved 
away from a complete focus on territorial control as a ground for jurisdiction, to a concept of ‘control 
or authority’ over persons.  Yet, this case dealt specifically with the question of human rights violations 
against individuals who were in some manner subject to custodial control or territorial control by the 
responding state.   
   
1.1 The role of ‘invitation’ 
None of the cases above have dealt with the issue of extraterritorial obligations where the 
contracting state has been explicitly invited by the territorial state to carry out acts within its territory.  
Even though the situation did not concern invitation, the ECtHR confirmed in Al Skeini, that 
extraterritorial jurisdiction, and consequently extraterritorial obligations, may apply in such 
circumstances where a state has been invited, entered into an agreement or consented to actions.  
Specifically, the Court held that it 
Recognised the exercise of extra-territorial jurisdiction by a Contracting State when, through 
the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, it exercises all or 
some of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government (Banković, cited 
above, § 71). Thus where, in accordance with custom, treaty or other agreement, authorities 
of the Contracting State carry out executive or judicial functions on the territory of another 
State, the Contracting State may be responsible for breaches of the Convention thereby 
incurred, as long as the acts in question are attributable to it rather than to the territorial 
State.28 
From the view of the Court, it seems that if a state acts within another state on the basis of 
‘consent, invitation or acquiescence’, and where the acts would be described as executive or judicial 
functions, then the foreign state may be responsible for breaches of the Convention linked to those 
                                                          
25 Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom, Application no. 55721/07 [2011] ECHR 1093 (7 July 2011).  
26 ibid at [133]. 
27 ibid at [138]. 
28 Al Skeini n 25 at [135] (reference to Bankovic in original)(emphasis added)   
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functions.  These bilateral interactions would be qualitatively different to occupation, territorial or 
custodial control and may, nonetheless, still result in responsibility for breaches of obligations 
stemming from international human rights law including the ECHR as the acts or omissions fall within 
the jurisdiction of the foreign state.  The wording used in the Al Skeini case leaves some issues to be 
addressed: How is ‘consent, invitation or acquiescence’ to be understood; and what is meant by 
‘public powers’ in such a context?  
With invitation at least the Court has been clear that for acts to be attributed back to the 
Contracting State the organ or agent must not be put at the disposal of the Territorial State. In Drozd 
and Janousek v. France and Spain the Court considered whether the acts or omissions of French or 
Spanish judges practicing in Andorra could be attributable to their home countries. It was held that 
neither country exercised jurisdiction because the officials in question did not act in their capacity as 
officials of the respondent States and were not were ‘not subject to supervision by the authorities 
of France or Spain’.29 Otherwise, the Court suggested, where supervision continues, state 
responsibility ‘can be involved because of acts of their authorities producing effects outside their own 
territory’.30 The judges from France and Spain were in effect seconded to Andorra, 31 akin to being ‘put 
at the disposal’ of another state which, according to the ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, has 
the effect of absolving the contracting state of responsibility under customary international law.32 
Ultimately invitation, consent or acquiescence are tests to distinguish between performing public 
functions in place of contracting state and putting the organ of the contracting state at the disposal of 
the territorial state.  
Determining whether an invitation places an organ of the contracting state under exclusive 
direction and control of the Territorial State may not involve the transposition of personnel.  In X and 
Y v. Switzerland, which involved a treaty incorporating Lichtenstein into Switzerland’s customs area,  
the decisions of the Swiss authorities in Bern had an effect outside Switzerland’s national boundaries 
with Lichtenstein’s consent.  The Commission first looked to see if the agreement between the 
authorities meant that the Swiss were acting ‘in distinction from their national competences.’33 The 
agreement meant that the Swiss authorities acted in conformity with Swiss law and it was determined 
that only the effect of their decision was extended to Lichtenstein’s territory. As such this meant that 
                                                          
29 Drozd and Janousek v France and Spain, App. No 12747/87 [1992] ECHR 52 at [96]. 
30 Ibid at [91]. 
31 International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), 73. 
32 ibid at Article 6 [5]. 
33 X and Y v Switzerland, App nos 7289/75 and 7349/76 ECHR 14 July 1977, (1978) 13 DR 241; Council of Europe, 
European Commission of Human Rights, Decisions and Reports, vol. 9, p. 73  
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Swiss jurisdiction was extended to Liechtenstein and that ‘Acts by Swiss authorities with effect in 
Liechtenstein bring all those to whom they apply under Swiss jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 
1 of the Convention.’34  
In contrast to the Commission’s approach in X and Y v Switzerland recognising extra-territorial 
jurisdiction where authorities ‘do not act in distinction from their national competences’ in the 
Contracting State (i.e. Switzerland) the Court in Al Skeini, borrowing from Bankovic, indicated that the 
organ must utilise a public power ‘normally exercised’ by the Territorial State.35 This raises the 
question of whether a power could be considered public in one state and private in another, or would 
an exercise of public power avoid giving rise to an exercise of jurisdiction because that power is not 
‘normally exercised’ in the Territorial State. This would be an unsatisfactory outcome given that 
delegation of public power by the Contracting State may serve to fill a governmental gap identified by 
the Territorial State. Surely the real question is whether the delegated function is an exercise of public 
power from the perspective of international law rather than its domestic classification. To understand 
what constitutes ‘public’ it is helpful to consider how the Court typically decides what acts are 
attributable to the state36 and how it defines the category of ‘governmental.’37 In both instances the 
Court typically looks to where the power originates and the actors exercising them by determining 
legal status of the organisation, the nature and context of the activity and whether such activities are 
typically subject to political oversight.38  
It has been suggested that the spatial model of jurisdiction first requires attribution of 
responsibility through agents of the State, such as soldiers, who create the conditions for jurisdiction 
to arise, such as the effective control of territory. From this starting point jurisdiction can emerge and 
give rise to positive obligations.39 What we can take from our case study is that attributing 
responsibility and establishing jurisdiction are closely entwined when it comes to considering 
regulatory and administrative effects and the non-territorial model of jurisdiction. Thus, where public 
powers are delegated – through invitation, consent or acquiescence – both attribution and jurisdiction 
can be analytically fused. They flow from the same set of facts and can be considered in lockstep 
                                                          
34 Ibid. 
35 Al Skeini n 25 at [135]. 
36 Yershova v Russia, App no 1387/04 ECHR 8 April 2010 at [55]. 
37 Radio France and Others v France (dec), no 53984/00, ECHR 2003X [emphasis added]; applied by 
Österreichischer Rundfunk v Austria, no 35841/02 ECHR 7 December 2006. See also Case 567/72 a decision by 
the Commission on the status of Austrian Communes and their ability ration personae to take a complaint to the 
court found them to exercise public functions on behalf of the state making them ‘governmental organisations’ 
38 Yershova v Russia n 36 at [55]. 
39 Marko Milanovic, Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Oxford: OUP, 2011) 52; Gentilhomme, 
Schaff-Benhadji and Zerouki v France, App nos 48205/99; 48207/99; 48209/99 [2002] ECHR 437. 
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especially where administrative acts are producing effects. An invitation creates a narrow lawful 
competence which in turn gives rise to a narrow scope of jurisdiction. We now consider how this 
framework applies to Ireland’s role in Bahrain. 
 
Part II Public authority exercised on the basis of invitation – Ireland’s interactions with Bahrain 
As has been explored, it is the public nature of extra-territorial activities that can give rise to 
‘jurisdiction.’ Before further discussion on the nature of ‘public authority’ exercised in a foreign state, 
we will consider the case study of Ireland’s interactions with Bahrain in the regulation of medical 
education. This helps to conceptualise how invitation and consent determine extra-territorial 
jurisdiction and the obligations of the state acting outside its territory.  
 
2.1 Ireland and Bahrain - cooperation in Medical Education 
In February 2011 Bahrain experienced a sustained period of unrest, including mass protests that called 
for political reform.40 The Government of Bahrain declared a ‘State of National Safety’41 and 
commenced a military response to the protests, killing several and injuring countless others during 
February and March 2011.42 Hospitals featured as sites of documented human rights abuses such as 
torture of medical staff and patients, arbitrary detention and discriminatory dismissal of staff,43 as well 
as Government policies promoting the withholding of medical treatment from certain groups on the 
basis of religion and political views.44 During that same period Bahraini authorities, it emerged, also 
                                                          
40 US Department of State, ‘2011 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Bahrain’ (2012) Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights and Labor, 1 at 
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm?dlid=186421 (last accessed 20 March 
2013).  
41 Royal Decree 18/2011, Art 8 and 9. 
42 See Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) ‘Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of 
Inquiry’ (Manama, December 2011) paras 186 – 642 at http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf (last accessed 
26 April 2013)  
43 ibid. 
44 Physicians for Human Rights ‘Do No Harm: a Call for Bahrain to End Systematic attacks on Doctors and Patients’  
(April 2011) 19  at http://physiciansforhumanrights.org/library/reports/Bahrain-attacks-on-doctors-2011-04-
22.html (last accessed on 20 March 2013); Medecins Sans Frontieres, ‘Health Services Paralyzed: Bahrain’s 
Military Crackdown on Patients: An MSF Public Briefing Paper’ (MSF, April 2011); Médecins Sans Frontières, 
‘Bahrain: Despite Reforms, Patients Still Fear Health System’ (MSF, 12 April 2012) at 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/press/release.cfm?id=5896&cat=press-release (last accessed 20 March 
2013); Martin Chulov, ‘Bahrain hospitals under siege as soldiers maintain Manama crackdown’ The Guardian 
(London, 20 March 2011) at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/mar/20/Bahrain-hospitals-under-siege-
manama (last accessed 20 March 2013) 
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engaged in the widespread torture of hospitalised protesters and detainees, some of whom died from 
their injuries.45  As the Director General of Médecins Sans Frontières observed: ‘[T]he hospital became 
a military target, and the health system a tool for the security apparatus, patients could no longer 
realize their right to treatment in a safe environment, and medical staff could no longer fulfill their 
primary duty of providing health care regardless of patients’ political affiliations.’46  Since this time 
various human rights groups have documented continuing violations of human rights standards47 and 
medical neutrality.48  
Bahrain’s medical facilities are also sites where medical students acquire mandatory clinical 
experience and training.  Due to a bilateral agreements from 2003 onwards the Royal College of 
Surgeons in Ireland has administered medical education in the Gulf State from a purpose built campus. 
Students who complete their training at the Bahrain campus of the “Royal Society of Surgeons in 
Ireland” (herein RCSI-Bahrain) are conferred with Irish medical degrees. During the establishment of 
RCSI-Bahrain, the Oireachtas (Irish Parliament) passed a Private Act enabling the RCSI to provide   
courses, examinations leading to degrees in surgery, medicine, nursing both inside and outside 
Ireland.49  In terms of governance the Bahraini programme is treated as a ‘mirror-image’ of the RCSI 
in Dublin, the curriculum and examination of its medical school in Bahrain are identical to those 
applied to Ireland-based students.50   
 
As with many jurisdictions Ireland’s medical education programmes are independently accredited 
to ensure their role in the enhancing and maintaining medical education. RCSI-Bahrain is subject to 
                                                          
45 BICI n 42 above, 282-302. 
46  C Stokes, ‘Hiding Behind Health’ (Médecins Sans Frontières, 20 July 2011) at 
http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/article.cfm?id=5456&cat=op-eds-articles (last accessed 
20 March 2013). 
47 Amnesty International, ‘Cancelled UN visit shows Bahrain 'not serious' about human rights’ (Amnesty 
International, 24 April 2013 at https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/2013/04/cancelled-un-visit-shows-
bahrain-not-serious-about-human-rights/ (last accessed 3 March 2015) 
48 Bahrain Center for Human Rights, ‘Bahrain: Limited Medical Access and Breach of Medical Neutrality (A need 
for accountability and an end to ongoing violations)’ (BCHR, 2013) at http://Bahrainrights.hopto.org/BCHR/wp-
content/uploads/2013/04/Bahrain-Medical-Access-Report-Final.pdf (last accessed 10 May 2013); Redress, 
‘Bahrain: Fundamental Reform or Torture Without End’ (Redress, 2013) at 
http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Fundamentalreform.pdf (last accessed 10 May 2013); 
Physicians for Human Rights, ‘Weaponizing Tear Gas: Bahrain’s Unprecedented Use of Toxic Chemical Agents 
Against Civilians’ (PHR, 2012)  at www.physiciansforhumanrights.org (last accessed 20 April 2012). 
49 The Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland Charters (Amendment) Act 2003, Section 30(b)(e)Higher Education 
Authority of Ireland ‘RCSI Granted Degree-Awarding Status’ (Dublin, 2010) at http://www.hea.ie/en/node/1382 
(last accessed 20 April 2013). 
50 Review by the Higher Education Authority and National Qualifications Authority of Ireland of the Royal College 
of Surgeons in Ireland in relation to the commencement of its degree-awarding powers: Terms of Reference, 
Criteria and Procedures (Dublin, 2010) at 




statutory regulation51 by the Medical Council, the designated authority responsible for monitoring and 
accrediting medical education programmes, including those delivered in third countries beyond 
Ireland’s borders. Irish law stipulates that such degrees should be awarded upon completion of 
approved programmes that are ‘at least the equivalent’ to those typically delivered in Ireland.52 
Practices associated with Bahraini hospitals have brought into question the compatibility of the 
facilities with Irish standards in medical education, and indeed the compliance of accreditation by the 
Medical Council with the human rights obligations of the Irish state.53  Following a site visit to Bahrain 
in late 2014 the Medical Council decided to grant unconditional accreditation to the RCSI-Bahrain 
medical programme raising further questions as to the compatibility of this process and outcome with 
Ireland’s human rights commitments.  
 
 
2.2 Ireland exercising jurisdiction in Bahrain  
 
Do ECHR obligations apply when the Medical Council accredits medical education programmes outside 
of Ireland’s territory such as that delivered in Bahrain? In other words would such a process be subject 
to Ireland’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the ECHR? To answer this question we can explore the 
exceptions to the territorial limitations on the ECHR’s jurisdiction using the Al Skeini schema described 
above.  
 
2.2.1 ‘Exercise some or all public powers’ 
Although an independent body the Medical Council was established and given powers by statute to 
act in the public interest.54 Its regulations and decisions are subject to Ministerial consulation, its 
decisions have been subject to judicial review in Irish Courts and, furthermore, it is referred to as a 
public body in other domestic legal instruments.55 As the Irish Medical Council appears to fulfil all of 
                                                          
51 Medical Practitioners Act 2007 and Qualifications and Quality Assurance (Education and Training) Act 2012. 
Accreditation is the term given to the Council’s powers under Section 88(2)(a) of the Medical Practitioners Act 
to ‘approve, approve subject to conditions attached to the approval of, amend or remove conditions attached 
to the approval of, or withdraw the approval’ programmes of basic medical education. 
52 ibid at Section 88(7). For the purposes of the Act a state other than an EU member state is referred to as a 
‘third country’.  
53 S. Devi, ‘Rights abuses linked to Irish surgical college in Bahrain’ (2013) 381(9882) Lancet 1986. 
54 Section 6 of the Medical Practitioners Act, 2007 states that the object of the IMC is ‘to protect the public’. 
55 Schedule 4 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997 defines the Medical Council as a non-commercial state 




the criteria used by the Court to determine what constitutes governmental or public function we 
conclude that the functions represent exercise of public powers. For completeness we can also 
consider whether the evaluation and supervision of medical education is ‘normally exercised’ by 
Bahrain. To this end Bahrain’s medical education is publicly administered and monitored56 and 
furthermore, from a transnational perspective, the UN ‘Classifications of Functions of Government’ 
include ‘the inspection, operation or support of universities and other institutions’.57  
 
 2.2.2 Invitation and Bahrain’s consent to exercise of public power 
The operation of the RSCI campus on Bahraini soil was brought about through a series of agreements 
including a memorandum of association and in licensing arrangements.58 Following on the 
controversies surrounding the ‘Arab spring’ protests this arrangement remained intact and without 
modification. In 2013 Bahrain’s Prime Minister explicitly ‘affirmed [his] government’s support for RCSI 
and the Bahraini-Irish relations, expressing appreciation for the college’s effort in training and feeding 
the health sector with well-qualified Bahraini medical cadres’ and referred to Bahrain’s interaction 
with RCSI as ‘fields of co-operation.’59 Most important of all official Irish60 and Bahraini61 documents 
both refer to RCSI-Bahrain’s first expected accreditation by the Irish Medical Council in line with 
Ireland’s statutory framework.  For its part the Irish Medical Council has confirmed it place in this 
                                                          
The Medical Council is also listed  as a ‘public body’ in the Official Languages Act and the Ethics in Public Office 
(Prescribed Public Bodies, Designated Directorships of Public Bodies and Designated Positions in Public Health) 
(Amendment) Regulations 2011 (S.I. No. 707 of 2011).  
56 See Bahrain’s ‘National Authority of Qualifications & Quality Assurance for Education & Training’ at 
https://www.qqa.edu.bh/En/Pages/default.aspx (last accessed 5 May 2015). 
57 United Nations Statistics Division, ‘Detailed structure and explanatory notes: COFOG code 09.4’ at 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/cr/registry/regcs.asp?Cl=4&Lg=1&Co=09.4 (last accessed 20 April 2013). 
58 RCSI-BAHRAIN ‘About RCSI Bahrain’ at http://www.rcsi-Bahrain.com/about (last accessed 25 March 2013). 
See also: ‘PM opens RCSI branch in Bahrain’ Bahraini News Association (Manama, 14 October 2004) at 
http://www.bna.bh/portal/en/news/377584?date=2011-3-20 (last accessed 25 March 2013);  RCSI-BAHRAIN 
‘Prospectus’ at http://www.rcsi-
Bahrain.com/files/2010/docs/20110222091512_PDF_RCSI%20Bahrain_prosJan2011.p.pdf (last accessed 25 
March 2013). 
59 Joe Humphreys ‘Bahrain government welcomes improved relations with RCSI after ethics row’ Irish Times 
(Dublin, 3 April 2013) at http://www.irishtimes.com/news/Bahrain-government-welcomes-improved-relations-
with-rcsi-after-ethics-row-1.1346919 (last accessed 15 May 2013). 
60 Review by the Higher Education Authority and National Qualifications Authority of Ireland of the Royal College 
of Surgeons in Ireland in relation to the commencement of its degree-awarding powers: Terms of Reference, 
Criteria and Procedures (Dublin, 2010) at 
http://www.nqai.ie/documents/FINALRCSIReviewTermsofReferenceandCriteria.pdf (last accessed 30 April 
2013); See also ‘Medical Council to review RCSI Bahrain’ Irish Medical Times (July 2010) at 
http://www.imt.ie/news/2010/07/medical-council-to-review-rcsi-Bahrain.html (last accessed 20 April 2013). 
61 Higher Education Review Unit, ‘Institutional Review Report: Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland- Medical 
University of Bahrain, Kingdom of Bahrain’ (Bahrain, 2009) http://moedu.gov.bh/hec/UploadFiles/Inst-Review-
En/RCSIE1.pdf (last accessed 20 April 2013) 
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arrangement: ‘As the responsible body for approving programmes of medical education and training, 
and the bodies that deliver those in Ireland, the Medical Council has been invited to consider the same 
bodies' delivery of medical education internationally for the purposes of quality assurance….’.62 Thus, 
the Bahraini authorities have demonstrated active and implicit consent to the implementation of Irish 
standards on Bahraini soil as including accreditation by Ireland’s Medical Council.   
 
In this context Ireland’s jurisdiction would cease to apply only if the Medical Council, National 
University of Ireland & RCSI-Bahrain were all placed at the disposal of the Bahraini state or if 
accreditation led to a conflict with Bahrain’s laws, neither of which have occurred. Such occurrences 
would disrupt attribution of legal responsibility to the Irish state. Furthermore Bahrain could simply 
withdraw consent to Ireland’s jurisdiction in the matter of medical education. Such was the case in 
Gentilhomme, Schaff-Benhadji and Zerouki v France63 where an agreement between a French 
education provider and the Algerian authorities was disrupted by the latter issuing a ‘note verbale’ 
rescinding an aspect of their agreement. It was this modification of Algeria’s consent that disrupted 
any prospect for the operability of France’s extra-territorial jurisdiction. 
When assessing the borderlines of extra-territorial jurisdiction the Court has alluded to implicit 
consent through ‘acquiescence’. While agreements forged in paper or international treaty will be 
crucial in determining consent to another state’s jurisdiction there may also be instances where this 
could be expanded upon by a failure on the part of the Territorial State to call into question exercises 
of public power beyond this agreement. In Öcalan v Turkey the European Court on Human Rights 
recognized that Kenyan authorities cooperated with their Turkish counterparts when apprehending 
the applicant on Kenyan soil and did not find that this cooperation lapsed at any point. It observed 
that no ‘international dispute’ emerged, nor any ‘deterioration in their diplomatic relations’ and the 
Kenyan authorities ‘did not lodge any protest with the Turkish government on these points or claim 
any redress’.64 In the case of the Bahrain there is no evidence to suggest resistance to the application 
of Irish standards in Bahrain given that unconditional accreditation was eventually granted by the 
Medical Council to the Bahrain programme of RCSI.  
 
                                                          
62 ‘Accreditation for the Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland Facility in Bahrain: Discussion’ Joint Committee on 
Education and Social Protection Debate (2 April 2014) at 
http://oireachtasdebates.oireachtas.ie/debates%20authoring/debateswebpack.nsf/committeetakes/EDJ20140
40200005?opendocument (last accessed 6 May 2015) 
63 Gentilhomme n 39 above. 
64 Ocalan v. Turkey, App no. 46221/99 ECHR [GC], 12 March 2003 at [95]. 
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2.3 Scope and limits of jurisdiction 
When a contracting state’s extraterritorial engagement is based on invitation the scope of this 
potential exercise of jurisdiction is determined by consent of the territorial state. Bahrain has, through 
its agreements with RCSI, accepted the Irish Medical Council’s accreditation process. The Medical 
Council typically accredits Irish medical education programmes using the standards of the World 
Federation for Medical Education (WFME)65 including assessments of the RCSI’s programmes in 
Ireland.66 Therein the WFME standards constitute the scope for Ireland’s jurisdiction in Bahrain. For 
practical purposes, and in line with WFME Standards, medical education requires an ‘operational 
linkage’ between the educational programme and on-site clinical training or practice in local hospitals 
and clinics.67 In the context of Bahrain this requires the Medical Council to take consideration of both 
the teaching programme and the facilities within which clinical training is carried out while using the 
WFME standards as ‘a lever for change and reform.’68 
 
2.4 Nature and scope of the obligations owed 
As in Ireland, RCSI-Bahrain’s medical programme is divided into two phases: a pre-clinical phase spent 
largely on a custom built campus and a clinical component during the ‘senior cycle’ of the course, 
spent largely on placements or ‘rotations’ in hospitals. RCSI-Bahrain operates from a purpose built 
university campus adjacent to the King Hamad General Hospital. Clinical tuition is provided here and 
in the Bahrain Defence Forces Hospital (BDF), the Cardiac Centre, the Ministry of Health Primary & 
Secondary Services (including health centres and the Salmaniya Medical Complex (SMC)) and other 
community clinics.69  Consequently, the Medical Council’s accreditation visit in 2014 to inspect RCSI-
Bahrain involved a visit to these affiliated sites. In light of this situation, human rights violations at 
                                                          
65 In accordance with powers granted by Sections 88(1)(a), (88)(2)(a) and (88)(2)(b) of the Medical Practitioners 
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66 Irish Medical Council, ‘Approval of Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland Graduate Entry Programme following 
Accreditation Visit 2010’ at http://www.medicalcouncil.ie/News-and-Publications/News/2010/Approval-of-
Royal-College-of-Surgeons-in-Ireland-Graduate-Entry-Programme-following-accreditation-visit-2010.pdf (last 
accessed 20 May 2013). 
67 WFME n 65 above; Basic Medical Education Standard 2.8 ‘Linkage with Medical Practice and the Health Care 
System’. 
68 WFME n65 above. 




these sites subsequent to the “Arab Spring” protests can be considered against Ireland’s 
administration of public functions in Bahrain and its obligations under the ECHR.70 
As has been explored, the WFME Standards demarcate the role of the Medical Council in Bahrain 
and as a consequence they formally determine the scope of Ireland’s jurisdiction.71  Ultimately this is 
a regulatory role, which evaluates an education programme. As a dualist state Ireland has 
incorporated the provisions of the ECHR into the European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. 
Section 3(1) of the Act places a statutory duty on ‘organs of the State’72 to ‘perform its functions in a 
manner compatible with the State's obligations’ under the provisions of the ECHR unless there is a 
statutory provision stating that this is not required. This performative obligation on ‘organs of the 
state’ has practical consequences as noted by De Londras and Kelly: 
Organs of State which come within the scope of s.3 should take measures to ensure 
compliance with the (ECHR), rather than simply wait for a negative court decision against 
them. At the very least these bodies would be expected to ‘proof’ their policies, strategies and 
decision making processes so as to ensure compatibility with the Convention.73 
This interpretation reflects Article 1 of the ECHR requiring that contracting parties ‘shall secure to 
everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms’ defined within the Convention. However 
the Medical Council, although it conducts site visits, does not have control or authority over persons 
or territory in Bahrain. Nonetheless, as in Al Skeini and X and Y v Switzerland, the exercise of public 
functions producing effects in the Territorial State could bring those persons affected under Ireland’s 
jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention.74 The Medical Council’s assessment and 
site visit have the effect of approving the Bahraini clinical learning environment relative to Irish 
standards including compatibility with the ECHR. As will be explored determining the content of the 
obligations states should comply with in this context these can usefully be divided into negative and 
positive obligations circumscribed by jurisdictional limits and the extent each situation requires.  
                                                          
70 Redress n 41; Physicians for Human Rights ‘Under the Gun: Ongoing Assaults on Bahrain’s Health System’ 
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Amnesty International, ‘Freedom has a price; Two years after Bahrain’s uprising’ (Amnesty International, 
February 2013) 9  at http://www.amnesty.org.uk/uploads/documents/doc_23012.pdf (last accessed 16 March 
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73 Fiona de Londras and Cliona Kelly, The European Convention on Human Rights Act: Operation, Impact and 
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Part III – The Bahraini Protests – human rights concerns related to the medical facilities  
 
Under considerable international pressure, the Bahraini Government instituted an independent 
review to investigate and report on the events during and after the clamp down on the Arab Spring 
protests. The Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) was mandated75 to document and to 
report on incidents in a list of locations on the basis of international human rights norms, ‘in particular 
at the Salmaniya Hospital.’76 Its report, delivered in November 2011, revealed a range of human rights 
abuses, including the widespread use of torture, committed by the Bahraini authorities. All 27 of its 
recommendations were accepted in their entirety by the Bahraini government these included: 
establishing an independent body to examine claims of torture and excessive use of force;77 a review 
of all convictions involving instances of political expression;78 and to ensure that public sector workers 
dismissed for exercising free speech or assembly were reinstated.79  
More than 70 medical professionals were arrested, many of whom alleged they were tortured 
while in custody.80 Human Rights Watch described that the Public Prosecutor ‘pursu[ed] other charges 
[against the medics] based solely on peaceful political activities protected under international law.’81 
A significant number were released following retrial in civilian courts.  In the time after the protests 
numerous sources observed the militarization of the hospital administration system linking this to 
deterioration in standards of medical care.82 Questions have since been raised over the Bahraini 
Government’s commitment to implementing the BICI-backed reforms.83 The follow-up report issued 
by the BICI on 21 November 2012 found no meaningful change in the policies of the Bahraini 
authorities. Subsequently human rights organizations consistently documented numerous accounts 
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of patient mistreatment, breaches of medical ethics and medical neutrality.84 This paper will restrict 
its analysis to two key areas of the Irish Medical Council’s accreditation process where Ireland’s 
obligations under the ECHR and public international law are directly implicated, namely, torture and 
protections in freedom of expression.  
 
3.1 Torture 
Ireland’s statutory rules85 defining the scope of the accreditation process outline the laws and 
standards governing the accreditation process. These include the WFME Standards and re-iterate the 
EU standards upon which the entire statutory scheme is based:  ‘A programme must comply with the 
requirements in Article 24 of the EU Directive 2005/36/EC for programmes of basic medical 
education.’ Article 24(d) of this directive provides that participants in programmes of basic medical 
education must acquire ‘suitable clinical experience in hospitals under appropriate supervision.’ 
Similarly the WFME Standard 6.2 demands that medical schools must ensure ‘adequate clinical 
experience and the necessary resources, including sufficient patients and clinical training facilities’. In 
this regard ‘facilities for clinical training should be evaluated regularly for their appropriateness.’86  
Appropriateness relates to the suitability of the facilities to develop key competencies of students 
within medicine and medical practice. The WFME Standards require that this includes knowledge and 
understanding of the basic clinical sciences and medical ethics relevant to the practice of medicine; 
attitudes and clinical skills and the ability to undertake lifelong learning and professional 
development.87 It is within this remit that relevant human rights considerations apply to relevant 
human rights concerns including the prohibition of torture contained in Article 3 of the Convention. 
In other words the determination what is ‘adequate’, ‘suitable’ experience and ‘appropriate’ training 
is not mutually exclusive of consideration of positive human rights obligations vis-à-vis this prohibition. 
                                                          
84 Redress n 41 above, 1. See also Physicians for Human Rights ‘Under the Gun: Ongoing Assaults on Bahrain’s 
Health System’ (PHR, May 2012) 30 at https://s3.amazonaws.com/PHR_Reports/Bahrain-militarization-may-
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85 Pursuant to its powers under section 11 of the Medical Practitioners Act and in satisfaction of its obligation 
under subsection 88(1)(a) thereof, the Council adopted the Medical Council Rules in Respect of the Duties 
of Council in Relation to Medical Education and Training by way of Statutory Instrument No. 528/2010 and 
588/2012. 
86 WFME n65 above, Basic Medical Education Standard 6.2; Post Graduate Medical Education Standard 6.2. 
87 ibid, Basic Medical Education Standard 1.4 Educational Outcome. 
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Where violations in medical ethics are concerned such overlap would be difficult to dismiss 
normatively and substantively.88  
The most credible allegations of torture relating to RCSI’s clinical training facilities are found in the 
BICI report. It found that ‘security services executed unlawful arrests on SMC premises, and attacked 
and mistreated some individuals, including medical personnel.’89 The cases where patients were 
arrested and removed from hospital were found to be a direct consequence of their injuries being 
sustained at protests.90 It was also established that the BDF took control of the entire hospital complex 
and placed some injured persons, whom it sought to keep under its control, on the sixth floor of SMC.91 
During this time the Commission heard testimonies that injured patients were beaten, insulted and 
made to stand for prolonged periods. It noted how the BDF did not deny that detention and 
interrogations occurred within this facility.92 Other injured persons were forcibly moved; some to 
police stations, detention centres and the BDF Hospital which is also used by RCSI for teaching where 
further mistreatment is alleged to have occurred.   
 
In interpreting what constitutes ‘appropriate supervision’93 consideration could include allegations 
by human rights organisations that health officials who supervise and manage the RCSI-affiliated 
hospitals were involved in torture and mistreatment of doctors and patients. The Bahrain Center for 
Human Rights produced a report identifying a number of senior figures, in medical administration, as 
being key players in human rights abuses. Among those listed were the head of the BDF hospital’s 
administration, the Chief of Medical Staff and CEO of Salmaniya Medical Complex, all of whom are 
alleged to have a role in disappearances, torture and mistreatment of medical staff and patients on 
and off the premises of these RCSI-affiliated hospitals.94 When Ireland’s Medical Council conducted a 
site-visit Bahrain in October 201495  as part of its accreditation process all of these persons maintained 
their managerial or supervisory roles with one appearing on RCSI-Bahrain’s website photographed 
tutoring students. None of issues relating to the torture or the links to the hospital administrators 
were mentioned by the Medical Council despite the annex of their report demonstrating that they 
had access to this information. 
 
                                                          
88 T. A. Faunce, ‘Will international human rights subsume medical ethics? Intersections in the UNESCO Universal 
Bioethics Declaration’ (2005) 31 J Med Ethics 173-178. 
89 BICI n 42 above, 847 
90 ibid, 842 
91 ibid, 847 
92 ibid, 797. 
93 Article 24 of the EU Directive 2005/36/EC. 
94 Bahrain Center for Human Rights n 48 above. 
95 Aidan Hanratty, ‘Bahrain accreditation team is now identified’ Irish Medical Times (Dublin August 29 2014)  
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Article 3 of the ECHR prohibits torture, and ‘inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’ and 
a state’s obligations extend to torture or risk of torture occurring outside of the Member State.96 
Although, in formal terms, this is a negative obligation the Court has recognized that there exists a 
positive obligation requiring public authorities to take steps to prevent torture and ill-treatment, all in 
an effort to ensure the effectiveness of the prohibition.  When an arguable claim of ill-treatment is 
made the Court has held that Article 3, read in conjunction with Article 1, gives rise to certain 
procedural obligations including a duty of effective, timely investigation97 even in cases where non-
State agents are involved.98 The UN Human Rights Committee likens such obligations to a form of ‘due 
diligence’.99 As accreditation requires making a determination on the appropriateness of supervision 
and the suitability of facilities to provide training in medical ethics the allegations of torture, 
mistreatment and violations of medical ethics involving the very same Bahraini medical sites and 
authorities suggests that the Medical Council has a positive obligation to take steps to consider and 
deter such conduct.100 
 
Accreditation could also be refused or made conditional on the Bahraini authorities taking steps to 
investigate and demonstrate accountability and institute mechanisms for torture complaints.  In 
considering how torture in Bahraini hospitals might further involve Ireland’s positive obligations under 
international law the obligation of non-recognition is significant given the legal status of the 
prohibition on torture as a jus cogens norm. 101 The ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility provide 
in Art. 41(2) that ‘no State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach’ of an 
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. In practice this includes the 
obligation not to recognize such things as illegal States, territorial annexation and even the outcomes 
of elections.102  
 
                                                          
96 Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 439. 
97 Assenov v Bulgaria (24760/94) (1999) 28 EHRR 652. 
98 MC v Bulgaria (39272/98) (2003) 15 BHRC 627. 
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Similarly a practice or act committed in contravention of the prohibition of torture may not be 
‘legitimated by means of consent, acquiescence or recognition’.103 While content of the duty of non-
recognition is still not clear, at a minimum it requires States to refrain from actions implying 
recognition of the lawfulness of the situation in question. This is of significance for Irish accreditation 
as it amounts to a form of formal recognition asserting that Bahrain’s clinical training sites live up to 
international standards and Irish law. It can be argued that the obligation of non-recognition requires 
non-accreditation where the prohibition on torture has been breached especially as factual, 
procedural and investigative shortcomings, integral to the respect of the prohibition, remain.  
 
 
None of the allegations of torture by hospital management, the Bahraini Defense Forces and the 
hospital authorities were mentioned or addressed in the Medical Council’s accreditation report. This 
is despite the accreditation team being provided numerous documents and articles detailing findings 
and allegations of torture in Bahrain’s medical system. The Council’s privileged access to Bahrain’s 
clinical systems contrasts with Bahrain’s refusal to allow a visit by the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Torture.104 Then there is the issue of Bahrain’s failure to fully investigate and deal with allegations of 
torture was noted following Bahrain’s Universal Periodic Review by the UN Human Rights Council,  
when Human Rights Watch, stated:  
 
Despite the fact that the BICI concluded that the abuses “could not have happened without 
the knowledge of higher echelons of the command structure” of the security forces, the 
investigations and prosecutions have so far not included any high-ranking officials.105 
 
Bahrain’s failure to investigate allegations of torture falling the supervision of security personnel  
involved in the administration of hospitals, not least the Bahrain Defense Forces Hospital, ought to be 
a matter of concern from an Irish perspective.  Without satisfying itself that allegations of torture, 
such as those documented by the BICI, have been appropriately investigated and dealt with in 
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accordance with international and European standards accreditation by the Medical Council has 
provided formal approval of the suitability of supervision in clinical sites.  
 
The Medical Council’s failure to even address the issue of torture while declaring Bahraini medical 
sites to have “appropriate supervision” is at odds with Ireland’s obligations under Article 3 of the ECHR 
and customary international law obligations including the obligation of non-recognition. Thus, we 
have argued that even in instance of considering the effect of the Medical Councils activities in 




  3.2 Restrictions on free expression  
 
Compliance with WFME standards requires close attention to communicative pathways integral to the 
provision of medical education.106  These include student/trainee feedback, complaints, programme 
evaluation, stakeholder involvement, linkages to the health sector, the evaluation of the needs and 
concerns of the local population, and needs assessment in graduate professional development. Thus, 
the accreditation standards operate on the assumption that there are no obstacles to stakeholders 
being able to freely express their opinions or impart information. Through these processes of 
communication the medical school is expected to have ‘a constructive interaction with the health and 
health-related sectors of society and government’.107   
 
 The Medical Council is bound by Article 19 of the ICCPR and Article 10(1) of the ECHR, which hold 
that everyone has the right to freedom of expression, the freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
                                                          
106 WFME n 65 above. Standard 1.2 of BME, PME & CPD describe ‘Participation in the Formulation of Mission 
and Outcomes’ and require input from a variety of stakeholders. BME Standard 1.4 ‘Education Outcomes’ 
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and impart information and ideas without interference by public authorities. While not unlimited, the 
right may only be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by 
law and are necessary in a democratic society.108 The protections contained in Article 10 of the ECHR 
also extend to the workplace in general109 and is a crucial component in a doctor’s capacity to behave 
ethically as they must be free to communicate on issues relating to health and mistreatment, even in 
context of violence.110  
In their report published in April 2013 the anti-torture NGO REDRESS highlighted how the health 
facilities in Bahrain, which include all RCSI-Bahrain affiliated hospitals, became embedded in a 
securitised environment precipitating consistent violations  undermining the conditions necessary for 
the respect of medical neutrality:  
[F]earing questioning or arrest if [protesters] approach any government run hospital or clinic 
for treatment for any injury that might be construed as connecting them with demonstrations 
... many of the individuals interviewed … sought treatment in private clinics or in  private 
homes …. There is a corresponding fear amongst health workers that they too may be 
questioned or arrested for providing treatment to individuals who may be construed as taking 
part in opposition to the regime.111 
 
According to the President of the Bahrain Nursing Society, in the time after the Arab Spring protests 
patients with ‘head traumas, broken bones or burns’ were first interrogated by police and health 
professionals were only allowed to treat patients after police investigated and cleared them for 
treatment.112 Arrests from hospitals (or immediately following discharge) of persons injured by pellets 
and tear gas canisters are alleged to continue.113 Bahraini medical professionals and activists fear 
speaking out on these practices out of fear for personal safety and loss of employment.  Physicians for 
Human Rights reported that medical personnel were ‘extremely reluctant to document their patients’ 
exposure to tear gas and frequently omitted ‘writing in the medical record the patient’s history, cause 
of injury, or any other information related to excessive use of force by Bahraini law enforcement 
officials, to protect these patients and their families’.114  
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Official instructions have worked to improve the detection of patients injured by security forces. A 
document dated 16th July 2012 allegedly circulated by the CEO of Salmaniya Medical Complex urged 
the Heads of Department to provide unrestricted access of public prosecutors to all medical files.115 
The Ministry of Health also issued a circular to public and private health facilities requiring medics to 
report to ‘security authorities’ all incoming patients with injuries due to suspected ‘criminal activities’ 
or face prosecution.116 Allegations that patients denied access to their own records117 and death 
certificates being altered to hide evidence of abuse have been documented by human rights NGO’s.118 
In addition to the fear of documenting the treatment of protesters in hospitals, many of the medics 
detained during the initial phase of the protests were apparently charged for activities relating to 
television interviews and online comments criticising of the authorities, including statements made 
on Twitter and Facebook.119 Amnesty International repeatedly refuted these findings, claiming the 
medics had ‘been jailed solely for peacefully exercising their legitimate rights to freedom of 
expression’.120 Dr Bart Janssens, Médecins Sans Frontières's director of operations, after considering 
the cancellation of an event on medical ethics co-sponsored by RCSI-Bahrain stated: ‘we are forced to 
conclude that today in Bahrain, it is not possible for medical professionals and international impartial 
participants to have a conversation about medical ethics’.121  
  
3.4 The accreditation 
 
Similar to other transnational accreditation processes the aim is to evaluate a medical education 
programme and ensure it reaches a standard that is ‘at least equivalent’122 to an Irish programme. On 
December 18 2014 the Irish Medical Council awarded unconditional accreditation to the RCSI-Bahrain 
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programme for 5 years without mentioning or considering any of the human rights issues raised by an 
independent commission of inquiry, activists and non-governmental organisations.123  During their 
evaluation of clinical sites the Medical Council simply transplanted and applied methodologies 
designed to work in the far less restrictive environment of Ireland. RCSI-Bahrain staff had an 
opportunity to discuss the operation of the programme with the accreditation team. Students were 
assured of anonymity and were allowed to opt-in to meeting with the Medical Council. In all cases the 
interviews with staff involved current RCSI employees and student were spoken with inside the very 
hospitals under scrutiny. Speaking negatively about such sites is not risk free. A month prior to the 
visit of the Medical Council the women’s rights activist Ghada Jamsheer was detained for tweeting 
about corruption, cronyism and falling medical standards at an RCSI-affiliated hospital that serves 
Bahrain’s military.124 She was promptly arrested and remained in detention throughout the Medical 
Council’s visit and deliberation on the same clinical site.  
In this context it is difficult to see how those with genuine concerns would be motivated to speak 
out, a situation that was widely anticipated in advance of the Medical Council’s visit including an open 
letter by several Bahraini human right organisations.125 In their final report no mention is made in the 
report of sectarianism, militarised administration, difficulties in treating protesters nor how the 
allegations of torture have been dealt with. Yet all of these issues were extensively referenced and 
explored in the human rights reports and articles provided to the accreditation team.126 At best the 
Medical Council nominally accepted its human rights obligations under Irish law by furnishing reports 
to the visiting team but effectively excluded it by applying manifestly deficient methodologies. 
Furthermore the unconditional accreditation approved by the Irish authorities failed to address 
obstacle to the freedom to impart information and openly discuss issues pertaining to medical ethics 
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and neutrality. Irish approval serves to validate the current manner in which Bahraini militarised 
hospital system is administered, likewise the fruits of silencing dissent through public prosecutions.  
Ultimately the legal manoeuvres contained with the accreditation report reflect an underlying 
political attitude. When questioned ahead of the accreditation visit about the situation in Bahrain 
Ireland’s Deputy Prime Minister (Tánaiste) and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, in 
contradistinction to Irish law, drew an arbitrary dividing line between the classroom and the hospital 
system where medical students are trained; ‘I think that it is important to distinguish between the 
involvement of the Royal College of Surgeons in the training of Bahraini medical personnel … and the 
detention of medical personnel by the Bahraini authorities’.127 This pre-emptively signalled that it 
would be politically expedient to selectively ignore human rights issues simply because they occur 
within one of the two learning environments used by students. It also incorrectly implies that hospitals 
and local doctors are not a key parts of the Irish medical curriculum.  
Finally, it is worth illustrating how accreditation is but one of a range of other, overlapping public 
oversight mechanisms that can extend and apply to transnational education programmes.  In this 
instance RCSI is a ‘recognised college’ of the Irish federal education body, the National University of 
Ireland (NUI) giving RCSI degrees awarding powers.128 In response to events in Bahrain and the 
controversies involving RCSI, NUI developed the ‘Human Rights Principles and Code of Conduct for the 
National University of Ireland and its Member Institutions’ (one of which is the Royal Council of 
Surgeons). Section 3 of the code provides that, 
The National University of Ireland and its member institutions have a special responsibility to 
ensure that as far as lies within their capacity the human rights of their students, staff and 
associates are fully respected, regardless of the country where they are located. This includes 
but is not limited to freedoms that are necessary for the good functioning of a university, such 
as freedom of association, freedom of expression, and freedom from discrimination.129 
During questioning by a parliamentary committee the Registrar of NUI revealed that the assessment 
of the human rights situation in Bahrain was largely limited to academic reports from external 
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examiners.130 Given the events since 2011 it would be pertinent to ask whether due diligence 
principles and methods have been followed, both in terms of general principles and also those 
provided for in the Code of Conduct.  
 
Part IV – Ireland’s positive obligations 
In Al Skeini the Court diverged somewhat from Bankovic where it held that the Convention should 
apply in toto as Article 1 was indivisible in cases where a contracting state controlled another state’s 
territory. In the former case situations short of territorial control involving the custody of individuals 
were alluded to: 
 
What is decisive in such cases is the exercise of physical power and control over the person in 
question…. the State is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the 
rights and freedoms under Section 1 of the Convention that are relevant to the situation of 
that individual. In this sense, therefore, the Convention rights can be ‘divided and tailored’.131 
 
 When dealing with ‘State Agent Control or Authority’ where there is no control of persons, 
structures or territory Convention rights and corresponding obligations hinge on the nature and scope 
of the consent between the Contracting State and the Territorial.  Bahrain consented to accreditation 
by the Irish Medical Council and the standards of the World Federation for Medical Education 
(WFME)132 generating, to borrow a term from information technologies, the ‘bandwidth’ of their 
jurisdictional connection. What has been illustrated in this case study is that where there is the 
potential for transnational administrative effect, similar to X and Y v Switzerland, that the ‘divide and 
tailor’ approach of the Court gives rises to negative as well as positive obligations. 
A state or its institutions are not under an obligation to assist another state in its public functions, 
including medical education.  However, human rights law requires that when a state does engage in 
such collaboration upon ‘invitation, consent or acquiescence’ its jurisdiction is exercised and it is under 
an obligation to ensure that the substance of the cooperation respects and protects human rights. In 
such situations ‘effective control’ over persons or territory is not a pre-condition for the positive 
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Convention obligations to arise. This highlights a divergence between attribution and jurisdiction in 
this context – with the Medical Council its acts are attributable to the Irish State whereas, thanks to 
Bahrain’s invitation and consent, Ireland’s jurisdiction applies giving rise to positive obligations.  
Positive obligations arising in the absence of territorial control have been considered tangentially 
in cases dealing a State’s involvement in legal proceedings abroad, usually along with the defence of 
sovereign foreign immunity. In Treska v Albanian and Italy133 and Manoilescu and Dobrescu v Romania 
and Russia134 the Court considered restitution proceedings with regards to property confiscated and 
transferred to another State.  In Treska Italy used for its embassy a confiscated Albanian residence 
taken by the Albanian authorities without compensation. In determining whether Italy’s responsibility 
under Article 1 could be engaged for failing to secure Convention rights of the house owners the Court 
determined it did not arise, not because positive obligations did not apply, but because Italy  ‘had no 
direct or indirect influence over decisions and judgments in Albania’.135 
The Court’s view that extra-territorial jurisdiction could be exercised when it has “direct or indirect 
influence” over decision making processes is cited in other cases most notably in McElhinney v. Ireland 
and the United Kingdom136 and Kalogeropoulou and Others v. Greece and Germany137  where 
‘sovereign power over the applicants’ was equated ‘no direct or indirect influence over the decisions 
and judgments’ wherever they are delivered.138 Where a State actually exerts a degree of influence 
this, apparently, can give rise to positive obligations: 
[E]ven in the absence of effective control of a territory outside its borders, the State still has 
a positive obligation under Article 1 of the Convention to take the diplomatic, economic, 
judicial or other measures that it is in its power to take and are in accordance with 
international law to secure to the applicants the rights guaranteed by the Convention.139 
 
This marks quite a departure from the technical, territorialised view of jurisdiction and marks a 
responsiveness to claims relating to positive obligations wherever a State acts and exerts influence in 
an extra-territorial setting.140 However support for a generalised positive obligation on the basis of 
merely exerting influence outside of a State’s territory remains scarce.141 Nonetheless some 
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commentators have gone as far to say it could mark the beginning of shift towards requiring states to 
take a general duty of ‘due diligence’ in their external dealing with other states.142  
Either way the ability of the Medical Council to impact the governance of medical facilities in 
Bahrain amounts to direct influence on these settings. Under Irish Law - where a medical education 
programme is deemed to have failed to live up to Irish standards - the Medical Council has the power, 
through consultation with the Irish Minister for Education and Science and Skills, to approve, approve 
subject to conditions, or remove approval for a programme of medical education.143 This amounts to 
something beyond mere influence as Bahrain has actively invited this regulatory mechanism and 
subscribed to Irish standards thus providing a foothold for positive obligations of the Medical Council. 
Should this direct influence prove to be illusory and Ireland finds itself in a situation where it is 
presiding over situations involving breaches of Convention rights and customary international law an 
obligation may arise on Ireland ‘to refuse their cooperation’ with other States if it emerges that an act 
of the other State is ‘the result of a flagrant denial of justice’.144    
 
Part V – Conclusion: Transnational public activity and extraterritorial obligations 
Recognising that transnational education exports public oversight mechanisms from 
contracting states’ sovereignty becomes blurred in the provision of this public good. The branch 
campus, as the epitome of transnational education, operates not in a vacuum but is deeply connected 
to local governance systems. Scenarios where a state exerts no direct control over people and 
territory, but performs a public function has not generated many cases in front of the Strasbourg 
Court. Nonetheless the case law shows that this activity has jurisdictional consequences requiring 
human rights scrutiny by the exporting State, a legacy of tertiary education’s distinctly public origins. 
The contours of extra-territorial obligations in this context are shaped by two features; the nature of 
the function being exported and the local interface with this operation of said function.  
In this paper it has been established that the accreditation of medical education in Bahrain 
falls within the jurisdiction of Ireland and its obligation to ‘secure to everyone within their jurisdiction 
the rights and freedoms’ of the Convention, thus including a positive obligation to secure.  Therefore, 
within this exercise of authority, Irish public bodies should do whatever they can to influence the 
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situation and to improve the human rights conditions for people connected to Bahrain’s medical 
facilities used for the delivery of Irish education.  Due to the close relationship between the two 
countries in medical education, Ireland should at least acknowledge and address the relevant 
violations taking place in Bahrain and utilise accreditation, itself a tool for reform, when upholding its 
own national standards. Furthermore accreditation should be contingent on clear conditions aimed at 
ensuring respect for human rights processes and standards expected under Irish human rights law. 
Ultimately, the issues facing RCSI and Ireland’s system of oversight is common to most actors 
engaged in the provision of transnational education: the question whether the classroom is ever 
divorced from the context of the host country. The Irish authorities have attempted to disrupt these 
entanglements with domestic human rights machinery by artificially constructing a conceptual barrier 
at the branch campus gate. This wilful and strategic deflection is an attempt to circumvent the legal 
connections wherein the evaluation of the local setting in the Territorial State falls under Ireland’s 
jurisdiction. However transnational education should be conditional on respect for human rights, not 
only in terms of academic content or outcomes, but also in the processes surrounding programme 
delivery. As this field grows in commercial significance the relevance of human rights obligations for 
universities and their public oversight mechanisms ought to be considered.   
 
